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Abstract We revisit the mathematical models for wireless network jamming
introduced by Commander et al. [12,13]: we first point out the strong connec-
tions with classical wireless network design and then we propose a new model
based on the explicit use of signal-to-interference quantities. Moreover, to ad-
dress the uncertain nature of the jamming problem and tackle the peculiar
right-hand-side (RHS) uncertainty of the corresponding model, we propose an
original robust cutting-plane algorithm drawing inspiration from Multiband
Robust Optimization. Finally, we assess the performance of the proposed cut-
ting plane algorithm by experiments on realistic network instances.
Keywords Wireless Networks · Network Jamming · Integer Programming ·
RHS Uncertainty · Multiband Robust Optimization · Robustness Cuts
1 Introduction
Wireless network jamming consists in compromising the functionality of a
wireless network by activating jamming devices (jammers) that disrupt net-
work communications by emitting interfering signals on the same frequencies
of the network. Jamming is commonly associated with military and security
questions: it is immediate to think about jamming hostile networks in war sce-
narios, to deny enemy communications, or in high-risk events, such as visits
*This is the author’s final version of the paper published in Optimization Letters 9(8),
1495-1510, 2015, DOI: 10.1007/s11590-014-0839-2r . The final publication is available at
Springer http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11590-014-0839-2.
Fabio D’Andreagiovanni
- Dept. of Optimization, Zuse Institute Berlin (ZIB), Takustr. 7, 14195 Berlin, Germany
- DFG Research Center MATHEON, Technical University Berlin, Straße des 17. Juni 135,
10623 Berlin, Germany
- Einstein Center for Mathematics, Straße des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany
Tel.: +49 30 84185460, Fax: +49 30 84185269, E-mail: d.andreagiovanni@zib.de
2 Fabio D’Andreagiovanni
of heads of State, during which it is imperative to avoid bomb detonation by
cellular phones. However, in recent times, jamming is also increasingly found
in peaceful everyday-life applications that are not related to military and secu-
rity issues. Italy provides two examples of such applications: the Italian public
administration has evaluated the expediency of using jammers during large
competitive examinations to prevent cheating, while schools have started to
deploy jammers to avoid that students get distracted by smart phones during
lectures1. USA provides another example: in some hotels, there is the suspicion
that unscrupulous managers have shrewdly placed jammers to deny cellular
coverage and force businessmen to use room phones, in an attempt to raise
the final bill of stays2.
The Wireless Network Jamming Problem (NJP) can be described as the
problem of optimally placing and configuring a set of jammers in order to
interdict communications of a wireless network. As pointed out by Commander
et al. in [12,13], though the problem is very relevant and there is a wide
literature about preventing hostile jamming, surprisingly the NJP has been
practically neglected until their work. Moreover, together with the work [14],
these seem to be the only papers that have directly addressed the problem.
Our main original contributions in the present paper are:
1. revisiting the models for the NJP introduced by Commander et al. [12,13,
14]. Specifically, we highlight the strong connections of the NJP with clas-
sical wireless network design and, as recommended by regulatory bodies,
we adopt a testpoint model and signal-to-interference (SIR) quantities to
represent coverage and jamming conditions, refining the models of [12,13,
14];
2. addressing the uncertain nature of the NJP, considering a more realistic
in-between case w.r.t. [12] (complete information case) and [13] (complete
uncertainty case), where we suppose to have partial information about
the network to be jammed. In particular, we suppose to have an estimate
of the SIR balance in each testpoint of the network and we propose an
original Robust Optimization (RO) approach to provide protection against
estimated deviations. Our RO approach also presents a different way of
dealing with uncertainty w.r.t. the scenario-based approach of [14];
3. proposing an original robust cutting-plane algorithm to tackle the right-
hand-side (RHS) uncertainty coming from uncertain SIR quantities. Tack-
ling RHS uncertainty by a canonical row-wise uncertainty approach and
cardinality-constrained uncertainty sets like [6] leads to trivial and conser-
vative robust counterparts. Our new algorithm allows to overcome these
conservatism and model rigidity and to exploit in an innovative way the
potential of recent Multiband Robust Optimization (see e.g., [3,7,8]).
1 Panorama. Cellulari a scuola: la soluzione c’e` ma la vietano (in Italian).
http://italia.panorama.it/Cellulari-a-scuola-la-soluzione-c-e-ma-la-vietano
(2007)
2 C. Elliott: The Cellphone That Doesn’t Work at the Hotel.
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/business/07jamming.html?_r=0 . The New York
Times 07.09.2004 (2004)
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
fundamentals of realistic wireless network design. These concepts are then
used in Section 3 to derive an optimization model for the NJP. In Section 4,
we discuss data uncertainty in jamming and present our original algorithm.
Finally, in Section 5 we evaluate our original algorithm on realistic wireless
network instances, to then derive conclusions in Section 6.
2 Classical Wireless Network Design
To define our new model for network jamming, we first discuss closely related
concepts from wireless network design. For modeling purposes, a wireless net-
work can be essentially described as a set S of transceivers stations (TRXs)
that provide a telecommunication service to a set of users that are located in
a target area. In line with recommendations by telecommunication regulatory
bodies (e.g., [1,11]), we decompose the target area into a set T of testpoints
(TPs), namely elementary portions of territory of identical and squared size.
Each TP is assumed to correspond to a “superuser” that is representative of
all users within the corresponding elementary area.
TRXs and TPs are characterized by a location (geographical coordinates)
and a number of radio-electrical parameters (e.g., power emission, frequency
channel, transmission scheme). TheWireless Network Design Problem (WND)
consists in establishing the location and suitable values for the parameters of
the TRXs to optimize an objective function that expresses the interest of the
decision maker (e.g., maximizing a service revenue function). For an exhaustive
introduction to the WND, we refer the reader to [15,18,20,25].
An optimization model for the WND typically focuses attention only on a
subset of the parameters characterizing a TRX. In particular, the majority of
the models considers the setting of power emission of TRXs and the assignment
of served TPs to TRXs as the main decision variables. These are indeed two
critical decisions that must be taken by a network administrator, as indicated
in several real studies (e.g., [10,15,17,18,20,21,25]). Other parameters that
are commonly considered are the frequency and the transmission scheme used
to serve a terminal (e.g., [16,17,23]). In [15,21], several distinct versions of the
WND are presented and a hierarchy of WND problems is identified.
Let us now focus attention on a TP t ∈ T : when covered with service, t is
served by a single TRX s ∈ S, called server, that provides the telecommuni-
cation service to it. Once the server of a TP is chosen, all the other TRXs are
interferers and reduce the quality of service obtained by t from its server s.
Analytically, if we denote by ps > 0 the power emission of a TRX s ∈ S, a TP
t ∈ T is covered with service (or served) when the ratio of the received service
power to the sum of the received interfering powers (signal-to-interference ra-
tio - SIR) is above a threshold δ > 0, which depends on the desired quality of
service [24]:
SIRts(p) =
ats(t) · ps(t)
N +
∑
s∈S\{s(t)} ats · ps
≥ δ . (1)
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In this inequality: 1) s(t) ∈ S is the server of TP t; 2) N > 0 represents the
noise of the system, which is commonly regarded as a constant whose value
depends upon the frequency used for transmissions (see [18,24]); 3) the received
power Ps(t) that t gets from any TRX s ∈ S is the product of the power ps
emitted by s multiplied by the factor ats, i.e. Ps(t) = ats · ps. The factor ats is
called fading coefficient, lies in the range [0, 1] and summarizes the reduction
in power that a signal experiences while propagating from s to t [24].
Through simple algebra operations, inequality (1) can be transformed into
the following linear inequality, commonly called SIR inequality:
ats(t) · ps(t) − δ
∑
s∈S\{s(t)}
ats · ps ≥ δ ·N . (2)
Since assessing service coverage is a central question in the design of any
wireless network, the SIR inequality constitutes the core of any optimization
problem used in wireless network design. In a hierarchy of WND problems,
a particularly relevant case is constituted by the Scheduling and Power As-
signment Problem (SPAP) [15,17,18,21,25]. In the SPAP, two decisions must
be taken: 1) setting the power emission of each TRX s ∈ S and 2) assigning
served TPs to activated TRXs (note that this corresponds to identify a subset
of service links TRX-TP that can be scheduled simultaneously without inter-
ference, so we use the term scheduling). To model these two decisions, two
types of decision variables are commonly introduced:
1. a non-negative continuous power variable ps ∈ [0, PTRX ] to represent the
power emission of each TRX s ∈ S;
2. a binary service assignment variable xts ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ t ∈ T, s ∈ S, that is
equal to 1 if TP t ∈ T is served by TRX s ∈ S and 0 otherwise.
By exploiting these two families of variables, the SPAP can be naturally for-
mulated as the following Mixed-Integer Linear Program (SPAP-MILP):
max
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
rt · xts (SPAP-MILP)
ats · ps − δ
∑
s∈S\{σ}
atσ · pσ +M · (1− xts) ≥ δ ·N t ∈ T, s ∈ S (3)
∑
s∈S
xts ≤ 1 t ∈ T (4)
0 ≤ ps ≤ PTRX s ∈ S
xts ∈ {0, 1} t ∈ T, s ∈ S .
The objective function aims at maximizing the total revenue obtained by serv-
ing testpoints (the coverage of each TP generates a revenue equal to rt > 0).
Each constraint (3) corresponds with the SIR coverage condition (1) defined
for a TP t served by TRX s and includes a sufficiently large valueM (so-called,
big-M coefficient) to activate/deactivate the constraint. Finally, constraints (4)
impose that each TP is served by at most one TRX.
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3 The Wireless Network Jamming Problem
Consider a wireless network designed by solving SPAP-MILP. Our aim is now
to compromise the functionality of the network by deploying jamming sta-
tions (jammers). A jammer has the essential task of emitting a signal on the
same frequency channel used by the jammed network to interfere with the
transmissions of the TRXs and destroy their service.
Let J be the set of deployed jammers and denote by pj > 0 the power
emission of each jammer j ∈ J . The presence of the jammers in the wireless
network has the effect of creating an additional interfering summation in the
SIR inequality (2) associated with each testpoint t ∈ T , namely:
ats(t) · ps(t) − δ
∑
s∈S\{s(t)}
ats · ps − δ
∑
j∈J
atj · pj ≥ δ ·N . (5)
Assume now that we want to interdict the communications in the network
by jamming. To operate the jamming we are allowed to choose the subset
J ′ ⊆ J of jammers that are activated and the corresponding power emissions
pj ∈ [0, PJAM ], ∀j ∈ J
′. We stress that it is rational to set the power emission
of each activated jammer to its highest feasible value, since this provides the
highest jamming effect. So we assume that if j ∈ J is activated, then it emits
at maximum power, i.e. pj = PJAM .
Let us consider now a wireless network made up of a set of TRXs S pro-
viding the service to a set of TPs T . Moreover, let us assume that this network
has been configured by solving problem SPAP-MILP. So we have at disposal
a feasible solution (x¯, p¯) of SPAP-MILP, which identifies the subset T ′ ⊆ T
of served TPs (i.e., T ′ = {t ∈ T : x¯ts = 1 for some s ∈ S} and the power
emission p¯s of each TRX s ∈ S. Given a served TP t ∈ T
′, we know that the
corresponding SIR inequality (5) without the jamming terms is satisfied by
the feasible power vector p¯, i.e. ats(t) · p¯s(t) − δ
∑
s∈S\{s(t)} ats · p¯s ≥ δ ·N .
In order to compromise service in t by jamming, the SIR inequality must be
violated and we must activate a subset J ′ ⊆ J of jammers such that:
ats(t) · p¯s(t) − δ
∑
s∈S\{s(t)}
ats · p¯s − δ
∑
j∈J′
atj · PJAM < δ ·N . (6)
If we introduce a binary jammer activation variable yj ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ J ,
which is equal to 1 if jammer j is activated (at its maximum power PJAM , as
discussed above) and 0 otherwise, and if we define the quantity:
∆SIRts(t)(p¯) = ats(t) · p¯s(t) − δ
∑
s∈S\{s(t)}
ats · p¯s − δ ·N , (7)
which expresses the SIR balance in TP t when assigned to TRX s(t) for a
power vector p¯, then the violated SIR inequality (6) can be rewritten as:
δ
∑
j∈J
atj · PJAM · yj > ∆SIRts(t)(p¯) . (8)
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This inequality expresses the jamming condition: to jam and deny service in
a TP, we must activate a subset of jammers whose total power received in
the TP is greater than the SIR balance granted by the TRXs of the wireless
network. This inequality constitutes the central element of the new jamming
optimization model that we introduce in the next paragraph.
3.1 A SIR-based model for the Wireless Network Jamming Problem
In our study, given an operating wireless network, we define the Wireless
Network Jamming Problem (NJP) as follows: we must select which jammers
to activate to maximize a profit function associated with jamming of served
TPs, while respecting a budget that we have at disposal for the activation.
The budget is introduced to model the fact that in real-world deployments we
expect to have limited resources available, thus restricting the possibility of
deploying jammers in the target area.
Suppose now that for each potentially activable jammer j ∈ J , we have the
possibility of choosing among m ∈ M = {1, . . . , |M |} typologies of jamming
devices, each associated with a distinct maximum power emission PmJAM and
a distinct cost of deployment cmj > 0. In particular, ∀j ∈ J we assume that
PmJAM < P
m+1
JAM and c
m
j < c
m+1
j , ∀m ∈ {1, . . . , |M | − 1}.
If we add an index m ∈M to the jammer activation variables to consider
the presence of multiple jamming devices and we introduce binary jamming
variables zt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ t ∈ T , that are equal to 1 if served TP t ∈ T
′ is jammed
and 0 otherwise, the NJP can be modeled as the following 0-1 linear program:
max
∑
t∈T ′
πt · zt (NJP-01)
δ
∑
j∈J
∑
m∈M
atj · P
m
JAM · yjm +M · (1− zt) ≥ ∆SIRt + ǫ t ∈ T
′ (9)
∑
j∈J
∑
m∈M
cjm · yjm ≤ C (10)
∑
m∈M
yjm ≤ 1 j ∈ J (11)
zt ∈ {0, 1} t ∈ T
′
yjm ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J,m ∈M
In this model, we maximize an objective function that includes profits πt > 0
deriving from jamming served TPs t ∈ T ′. Constraints (9) are derived from the
SIR jamming condition (8). Note that the constraints include a big-M term for
activation/deactivation: this is necessary since, due to the budget constraint
(10), it may happen that not all served TPs can be jammed at the same time,
thus requiring to choose those that are jammed. Constraint (10) expresses the
budget condition: we can activate a subset of jammers whose total cost does
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not exceed the total budget C > 0. Finally, constraints (11) impose that we
can install at most one jamming device in each activated jammer.
Remark. In constraints (9), we just show the dependence of the SIR balance
∆SIRt on the TP index t, omitting s(t) and p¯. We do this since, assuming the
point of view of the NJP decision maker, we are only interested in knowing
the value of the SIR balance in t and we can neglect the information about
the serving TRX and the power of the TRXs. We also highlight the presence
of a very small value ǫ > 0 to overcome the strict inequality of (8).
4 Multiband Robust Optimization in Wireless Network Jamming
In the previous section, we have considered a deterministic version of the NJP,
namely we have assumed to know exactly the value of all data involved in the
problem. However, in practice this assumption is likely to be not true, as also
discussed in [13,14]: assuming to possess a complete knowledge about the un-
friendly network is unrealistic, especially in defence and security applications,
where it may be very difficult or even dangerous to gather accurate informa-
tion. Instead it is rational to assume that we can just rely on estimates of the
position and the radio-electrical configuration of the TRXs. As a consequence,
it is highly reasonable to assume that we just possess an estimate of the value
of the SIR balance ∆SIRt in every TP t. Following a practice that we have
observed among wireless network design professionals dealing with uncertain
SIR quantities (see [15]), we use an estimate ∆SIRt as a reference nominal
value to define an interval of variation of the quantity, whose bounds reflect
the reliability of the limited information that we have at disposal and our risk
aversion. If we denote by d−t < 0 and d
+
t > 0 the maximum negative and pos-
itive deviation from ∆SIRt that we have derived on the basis of our limited
information, then the (unknown) actual value ∆SIRt belongs to the interval:
[∆SIRt + d
−
t , ∆SIRt + d
+
t ] . We note that the definition of the interval of
variation of ∆SIRt can also take into account the intrinsic uncertainty of the
fading coefficients atj of the jammers: propagation of wireless signals in a real
environment is affected by many distinct factors (e.g., distance between the
TRX and the TP, presence of obstacles, weather) that are very hard to assess
precisely. Therefore the exact value of the fading coefficients is typically not
known (see [15] and [24] for an exhaustive discussion).
An example may help to clarify the negative effects of uncertainty in the
NJP. Note that, as common in the WND practice, we express fading and
power quantities according to a decibel (dB) scale. More specifically, since we
measure power quantities in milliwatts (mW ), we express power in decibels
by referring to decibel-milliwatts (dBmW ).
Example 1 (Uncertainty in the NJP). Consider a TP that is part of a
wireless network subject to a noise of NdB = −114 dBmW and operating with
a SIR threshold δdB = 10 dB and that receives a serving power of −48 dBmW
and a total interfering power (including noise) of −61 dBmW . By formula (1),
the SIR in the TP is higher than δdB, being equal to about 13 dB. Therefore
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the TP is served. The corresponding SIR balance ∆SIR can be computed by
formula (7) and is equal to about −50 dBmW .
Suppose now that we want to jam the TP and that we can install a single
jammer in a site associated with a fading coefficient of −77 dB towards the
considered TP. Additionally, suppose that the jammer can accommodate either
a device J1 with P
J1
JAM = 20 dBmW or a more powerful and costly device J2
with P J2JAM = 27 dBmW . If we assume to know all the features of the jammed
network, then we can successfully jam the TP by generating an additional
received interfering power of at least about 17 dBmW . So installing the less
powerful device J1 emitting at PJAM is sufficient to deny service.
However, as previously discussed, in real-world scenarios it is likely that we
do not know the exact value of ∆SIR, but we just possess an estimate ∆SIR
and an interval of deviation. Suppose then that our estimate is ∆SIR = −50
dBmW and that we consider reasonable to experience deviations up to ±20%
of this value. So the actual value ∆SIR lies in the interval [−60,−40] dBmW.
This interval reflects how trustable we consider the available information about
the unfriendly network and expresses also our personal risk aversion. If the
worst deviation occurs, we have ∆SIR = −40 dBmW and activating J1
would be no more sufficient to successfully jam the TP: the jamming solu-
tion deploying J1 would be infeasible and thus useless. So, if we want to be
protected against this deviation, we should switch to the more powerful jam-
mer J2, at the price of a higher deploying cost. ⊓⊔
As the example has shown, the presence of uncertain data in an optimization
problem can lead to very bad consequences: as it is known from sensitivity
analysis, even small deviations in the value of input data may make an opti-
mal solution heavily suboptimal, whereas feasible solutions may reveal to be
infeasible and thus completely useless in practice [4,5]. In our application, it
is thus not possible to optimize just referring to the nominal values ∆SIRt,
but we must take into account the possibility of deviations in an interval.
Many methodologies have been proposed over the years to deal with data
uncertainty: Stochastic Programming is commonly considered the oldest, while
in the last decade Robust Optimization has known a wide success, especially in
real-world applications thanks to its accessibility and computational tractabil-
ity. We refer the reader to [4,5] for a general discussion about the impact of
data uncertainty in optimization and for an overview of the main methodolo-
gies proposed in literature to deal with uncertain data. The two references are
in particular focused on theory and applications of Robust Optimization (RO),
the methodology that we adopt in this paper to tackle data uncertainty. RO
is based on two main concepts: 1) the decision maker defines an uncertainty
set, which reflects his risk aversion and identifies the deviations of coefficients
against which he wants to be protected; 2) protection against deviations spec-
ified by the uncertainty set is guaranteed under the form of hard constraints
that cut off all the feasible solutions that may become infeasible for some de-
viations included the uncertainty set. Formally, suppose that we are given a
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generic 0-1 linear program:
v = max c′ x with x ∈ F = {Ax ≤ b, x ∈ {0, 1}n}
and that the coefficient matrix A is uncertain, i.e. we do not know the exact
value of its entries. However, we are able to identify a family A of coefficient
matrices that represent possible valorizations of the uncertain matrix A, i.e.
A ∈ A. This family represents the uncertainty set of the robust problem. A
robust optimal solution, i.e. a solution protected against data deviations, can
be computed by solving the robust counterpart of the original problem:
vR = max c′ x with x ∈ R = {A x ≤ b ∀A ∈ A, x ∈ {0, 1}n} ,
which considers only the solutions that are feasible for all the coefficient ma-
trices in the uncertainty set A. Therefore, the robust feasible set is such that
R ⊆ F . The choice of the coefficient matrices included in A should reflect the
risk aversion of the decision maker.
Guaranteeing protection against data deviations entails the so-called price
of robustness [6]: the optimal value of the robust counterpart is in general
worse than the optimal value of the original problem, i.e., vR ≤ v, due to hav-
ing restricted the feasible set to only robust solutions. The price of robustness
reflects the features of the uncertainty set: uncertainty sets expressing higher
risk aversion will take into account more severe and unlikely deviations, leading
to higher protection but also higher price of robustness; conversely, uncertainty
sets expressing risky attitudes will tend to neglect improbable deviations, of-
fering less protection but also a reduced price of robustness.
In the next paragraph, we fully describe the uncertainty model that we adopt.
4.1 RHS Uncertainty in Wireless Network Jamming
The data uncertainty affecting our problem needs a special discussion. As
pointed out in [4,5], most RO models considers so-called row-wise uncertainty.
This means that protection against data deviations is separately defined for
each constraint subject to uncertainty, by considering the worst total deviation
that the constraint may experience w.r.t. the uncertainty set. More formally,
consider again a generic uncertain 0-1 linear program:
max
∑
j∈J
cj · xj s.t.
∑
j∈J
aij · xj ≤ bi i ∈ I, xj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J .
where w.l.o.g we assume that the uncertainty just regards the coefficients aij
(uncertainty affecting cost coefficients or RHSs can be easily reformulated as
coefficient matrix uncertainty, see [6]). If we denote the uncertainty set by U ,
following a row-wise uncertainty paradigm the robust counterpart is:
max
∑
j∈J
cj · xj s.t.
∑
j∈J
aij · xj +DEVi(x, U) ≤ bi i ∈ I, xj ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ J .
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where each uncertain constraint i ∈ I 1) refers to the nominal value a¯ij of
each coefficient and 2) includes an additional term DEVi(x, U) to represent
the maximum total deviation that i may experience for the solution x and the
uncertainty set U . This problem is actually non-linear since DEVi(x, U) hides
a maximization problem based on the uncertainty set definition (see [6,7,8]).
A central question in RO is how to model the uncertainty through a suit-
able uncertainty set U . The majority of applied studies of RO model U as a
cardinality-constrained uncertainty set [5], primarily referring to the renowned
Γ -robustness model (Γ -Rob) by Bertsimas and Sim [6]. The main feature of
these particular uncertainty sets is to impose an upper bound on the number
of coefficients that may deviate to their worst value in each constraint. The
non-linearity of the robust counterpart due to the presence of DEVi(x, U) is
then solved by exploiting strong duality and defining a larger but compact and
linear robust counterpart, as explained in [6] and [7,8].
In relation to this general row-wise RO setting, the uncertain NJP that
we consider is a special type of uncertain problem: uncertainty just affects the
RHS of each SIR constraint of NJP-01. As a consequence, if we adopt row-
wise uncertainty and a cardinality-constrained uncertainty set, then the upper
bound on the number of deviating coefficient in each constraint (9) is equal to
either 0 or 1. In other words, either the constraint is not subject to uncertainty
and thus the actual value and the nominal value coincide (i.e., ∆SIRt =
∆SIRt) or the constraint is subject to uncertainty and thus the actual value
is equal to the highest deviating value (i.e., ∆SIRt = ∆SIRt+ d
+
t ). Thus the
robust counterpart simply reduces to a nominal problem with modified RHS
values. We stress that this is a very rigid representation of the uncertainty and
we would like to benefit from a richer representation.
A source of inspiration for a richer model can be represented by Multiband
Robust Optimization (MB) and related multiband uncertainty sets, introduced
by Bu¨sing and D’Andreagiovanni in 2012 to generalize and refine classical
Γ -Rob (see e.g., [7,8,9] and [3]). In our case, we want to adopt a distinct
but similar definition of multiband uncertainty. To define this multiband-like
uncertainty set for RHS uncertainty:
1. we partition the overall deviation range [d−t , d
+
t ] into K bands, defined on
the basis of K deviation values:
−∞ < d−t = d
K−
t < · · · < d
−1
t < d
0
t = 0 < d
1
t < · · · < d
K+
t = d
+
t < +∞;
2. through these deviation values, K deviation bands are defined, namely: a
set of positive deviation bands k ∈ {1, . . . ,K+} and a set of negative devia-
tion bands k ∈ {K−+1, . . . ,−1, 0}, such that a band k ∈ {K−+1, . . . ,K+}
corresponds to the range (dk−1t , d
k
t ], and band k = K
− corresponds to the
single value dK
−
t . Note that K = K
+ +K−;
3. considering the RHS values ∆SIRt of the entire set of constraint (9), we
impose a lower and upper bound on the number of values that may deviate
in each band: for each band k ∈ K, we introduce two bounds lk, uk ∈ Z+:
0 ≤ lk ≤ uk ≤ |T
′|. As additional assumptions, we do not limit the number
of coefficients that may deviate in band k = 0 (i.e., u0 = |T
′|), and we
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impose that
∑
k∈K lk ≤ |T
′|, to ensure the existence of a feasible realization
of the uncertainty set.
We call this set RHS-Multiband Set (RHS-MB).
Remark. We stress that point 3 differs from the classical definition of multi-
band uncertainty set, presented in [7,8], where a row-wise uncertainty perspec-
tive is assumed and the system of bounds for the bands is defined separately
for each uncertain constraint of the problem.
An MB uncertainty set is particularly suitable to represent the past behaviour
of uncertainty represented by histograms, as explained in [3,7,8]. Moreover,
such set has the advantage of taking into account negative deviation bands,
which are neglected in classical cardinality-constrained sets: we want of course
to be protected against positive deviations that lead to infeasibility, but in real-
world applications we commonly experience also negative deviations, which
compensate the positive deviations and reduce the conservatism of solutions.
A critical question is now: how can we solve the uncertain NJP when
RHS uncertainty is modeled by a RHS-Multiband Set? In the case of a purely
linear program, we could define the dual problem of our uncertain problem,
thus transforming the RHS uncertainty into objective function uncertainty
and then adopt a standard RO dualization approach and reach a compact
robust counterpart, as in [22]. However, due to the integrality constraints, the
classical dualization approach in our case cannot be operated.
As an alternative, we can adopt a robust cutting plane approach: we solve
NJP-01 obtaining an optimal solution, then we check whether the solution is
also robust and feasible w.r.t. a specified RHS-MB. If this is the case, we have
found a robust optimal solution and we have done. Otherwise we separate a
robustness cut, namely an inequality that cut off this non-robust solution, we
add the cut to the problem and we solve the new resulting problem. This basic
step is then iterated as in a canonical cutting-plane algorithm, until no new
cut is separated and thus the generated solution is robust and optimal.
Under canonical row-wise uncertainty, in Γ -Rob and MB, robustness cuts
can be efficiently separated. For Γ -Rob, the separation of a robustness cut is
trivial and just consists in sorting the deviations and choosing the worst Γ > 0
[19]. This simple approach is not valid instead for MB, but in [7,8] we proved
that the separation can be done in polynomial time by solving a min-cost flow
problem.
As we stressed above, RHS-MB poses a new challenge. More formally, sup-
pose that we have a feasible solution (z¯, y¯) to NJP-01 and that we want to
check its robustness. Let us denote by T ′ the subset of TPs that are suc-
cessfully jammed. A robustness cut is generated by solving the following 0-1
linear program, that can be interpreted as the problem of an adversarial that
attempts to compromise the feasibility of our optimal jamming solution by
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picking up the worst deviation for (z¯, y¯) allowed by RHS-MB.
V = max
∑
t∈T ′
vt (SEP)
∑
k∈K
dkt · w
k
t +M · (1 − vt) ≥ JAMt −∆SIRt t ∈ T
′ (12)
lk ≤
∑
j∈J
wkt ≤ uk k ∈ K (13)
∑
k∈K
wkt ≤ 1 t ∈ T
′ (14)
wkt ∈ {0, 1} t ∈ T
′, k ∈ K (15)
vt ∈ {0, 1} t ∈ T
′ . (16)
The separation problem SEP uses 1) a binary variable vt, ∀t ∈ T
′ that is equal
to 1 when the jamming of TP t is denied and 0 otherwise; 2) a binary variable
wkt that is equal to 1 when the SIR balance ∆SIRt of t deviates in band k
and 0 otherwise. The objective function aims at maximizing the number of
TPs whose jamming is denied by the adversarial. A constraint (12) expresses
the violation of the corresponding constraint (9) when the jamming of TP
t is denied by feasible deviations of the SIR balance according to RHS-MB,
namely JAMt < ∆SIRt +
∑
k∈K d
k
t · w
k
t , where JAMt = δ
∑
j∈J
∑
m∈M atj ·
PmJAM · y¯jm is the total jamming power that t receives for jamming solution
(z¯, y¯). Constraints (13)-(14) enforce the structure of the uncertainty set RHS-
MB: the first family imposes the lower and upper bounds on the number of
RHS values ∆SIRt that may deviate in each band k ∈ K, whereas the second
family imposes that each value ∆SIRt deviates in at most one band (note that∑
k∈K w
k
t = 0 corresponds with no deviation and is equivalent to w
0
t = 1).
It is easy to observe that if the optimal value V of SEP is equal to 0, then
(z¯, y¯) is robust, since it is not possible to compromise the jamming of any TP
for the given uncertainty set RHS-MB. On the contrary, if V ≥ 1 and (v∗, w∗)
is an optimal solution of SEP, then (z¯, y¯) is not robust, the jamming of V TPs
may be compromised and
∑
t∈T ′: v∗
t
=1
zt ≤ V − 1 (17)
is evidently a robustness cut that we must add to the original problem. After
this we can iterate the basic robustness check step.
The general structure of the proposed robust cutting plane algorithm is
described in Algorithm 1. Assuming to use a solver like CPLEX implementing
a branch-and-cut solution algorithm, the separation problem is solved every
time that the solver finds a feasible solution to NJP-01. If a robustness cut is
identified for the current solution, then it is added as constraint to NJP-01.
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Algorithm 1 Robust Cutting Planes for NJP subject to RHS-MB uncertainty
Input: an instance of NJP-01 and of RHS-MB
Output: a robust optimal solution (z∗, y∗) to NJP-01 w.r.t. RHS-MB (if existent)
1: Solve NJP-01 by a branch-and-cut-based MIP solver (denoted by SOLVER)
2: while SOLVER has not find a robust optimal solution (z∗, y∗) to NJP-01 or has proved
that (z∗, y∗) does not exist do
3: Run SOLVER
4: if SOLVER finds a feasible solution (z¯, y¯) to NJP-01 then
5: Solve SEP for (z¯, y¯) and RHS-MB
6: if V > 0 then
7: Generate a robustness cut (17) and add it to NJP-01
8: end if
9: end if
10: end while
5 Computational results
To evaluate the performance of our original robust cutting plane algorithm,
we considered a set of 15 realistic instances, based on network data defined
in collaboration with network engineers of the Technical Strategy & Innova-
tions Unit of British Telecom Italia. All the instances refer to a fixed WiMAX
network (see [2], [16] and [15] for an introduction to WiMAX technology and
modeling) and are based on real terrain data model and population statistics of
a residential urban area from the administrative district of Rome (Italy). The
instances consider distinct networks with up to |T | = 224 TPs and |S| = 20
TRXs, operating on one of the frequency channels reserved for WiMAX trans-
missions in Italy in the band [3.4÷3.6] GHz and using a QAM-16 modulation
scheme. We used these data to build the MILP problem SPAP-MILP for each
instance and obtain realistic wireless network configurations to jam by solving
the uncertain version of problem NJP-01. The revenue rt associated with the
service coverage of each TP was derived from population statistics.
In order to build NJP-01 and set the robust cutting-plane algorithm, we
assume that we know the set T ′ of served TPs. However, we also assume that
we do not exactly the value of the SIR balance granted by the solution of
SPAP-MILP, but we just have at disposal an estimate ∆SIRt (different from
the actual value provided by the solution). On the basis of discussions on the
topic with network professionals, we decided to model deviations through an
RHS multiband uncertainty set including 5 deviation bands (2 negative and 2
positive, besides the null deviation band) and with a basic deviation of each
band equal to 20% of the nominal value. Concerning the jammers, we supposed
to have three typologies of jammers (i.e., |M | = 3) with a cost of deployment
reflecting the population in the TPs and increasing as the population in the
TP increases (we assume a higher risk of deployment in more populated areas
where the jammers could be discovered). The profit πt of successfully jamming
a TP was also based on population data.
All experiments were made on a 2.70 GHz Intel Core i7 with 8 GB. The
code was written in the C/C++ programming language and the optimization
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Table 1 Experimental results
ID |T | |S| |T ∗| |J | #JAM(Nom) #JAM(Rob) PoR% #Cuts
I1 100 6 65 15 44 37 -15.90 29
I2 100 9 71 15 51 45 -11.76 41
I3 100 12 75 15 46 38 -17.93 37
I4 150 6 85 15 49 43 -12.24 32
I5 150 9 93 15 68 57 -16.17 31
I6 150 12 106 20 75 64 -14.66 35
I7 169 12 92 20 47 39 -17.02 49
I8 169 16 95 20 66 53 -19.69 58
I9 169 20 120 20 69 53 -23.18 75
I10 196 12 108 20 73 58 -20.54 68
I11 196 16 122 25 82 69 -15.85 54
I12 196 20 134 25 89 70 -21.34 92
I13 224 15 142 25 102 82 -19.60 87
I14 224 20 159 25 115 96 -16.52 101
I15 224 25 170 25 109 93 -14.67 103
problems were solved by IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.5 with the support of Concert
Technology. The results of the experiments are reported in Table 1, in which
the first column states the instance ID, whereas the following four columns
report: the number |T | of TPs and the number |S| of TRXs in the SPAP-
MILP instance; the number |T ∗| of covered TPs in the feasible solution of
SPAP-MILP used for building the corresponding NJP-01 instance; the number
|J | of jammers in the NJP-01 instance. The following four columns report in-
stead: the optimal number #JAM(Nom) of jammed TPs for the nominal NJP-
01 problem (no uncertainty considered); the optimal number #JAM(Rob) of
jammed TPs for the robust version of NJP-01 solved by Algorithm 1; the per-
centage price of robustness PoR%; the number #Cuts of robust cuts generated
during the execution of Algorithm 1.
The main observations about the results are related to the comparison be-
tween the optimal value of the nominal problem and that of its robust version.
Concerning this central point, we can observe that the price of robustness that
we must face keep contained, reaching an average value of -17,1% and a peak
of -23.1% in the case of instance I9. We consider this a reasonable price to
pay to obtain the protection against the deviations that the decision maker
considers relevant. Furthermore, we can notice that the number of robust cuts
that are separated during the execution of Algorithms 1 is limited, especially
in the case of the smaller instances. Concerning solution time, while solving
the uncertain version of NJP-01 required a time ranging from about 30 to
about 70 minutes, depending upon the features of the wireless network config-
uration to be jammed identified by a solution of SPAP-MILP, the execution
time of Algorithm 1 could reach approximately 3 hours. We believe that this
time could be sensibly reduced by studying a stronger separation model and
more efficient separation algorithms.
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6 Conclusions
We considered the Wireless Network Jamming Problem, namely the problem
of optimally placing and configuring a set of jammers in order to inderdict
communications of a wireless networks. We revisited the models proposed in
the seminal works by Commander et al., better highlighting the strong con-
nections with classical wireless network design formulations. Moreover, we ad-
dressed the uncertain nature of the problem by proposing an original robust
cutting plane algorithm, inspired by Multiband Robust Optimization, to deal
with the RHS uncertainty of the problem and overcome the rigidity of canon-
ical row-wise uncertainty approaches. As future work, we plan to investigate
stronger models for the problem, tackling in particular the presence of big-M
coefficients and devising more effective and efficient separation algorithms.
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